

Lost and Found Certificates

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Who We Are

lan

CertGraph

https://dns.coffee

https://lanrat.com

https://github.com/lanrat

<u>@LANRAT</u>

Dylan

truffleHog

WPA2-HalfHandshake-Crack

Pastejacking

Other stuff...

https://github.com/dxa4481

bygonessl@insecure.design




The Problem

Certificates can outlive a domain's ownership

Old owner retains a valid SSL certificate through the next owner

How can you know?

- Buy a new domain... hope for the best?
- Prior to 2013 no visibility





Certificate Transparency!



- Log of all certificates issued by public Certificate Authorities
- Designed to catch misbehaving Certificate Authorities
- Publicly auditable and searchable
- ½ billion certs and growing

۵	COMODO CA Limited [GB] https://crt.sh/?q=google.com								
				<u>crt.sh</u>	ld	lentity S	earch	2	Group by I
				Criteria		Identity = 'goo	gle.com'		
	crt.sh ID	Logged At 公	Not Before					Issuer Na	ame
	336351164	2018-02-20	2018-02-20	C=US, O=Go	ogle	Trust Services,	CN=Google	e Internet A	uthority G3
	336350783	2018-02-20	2018-02-20	C=US, O=Go	ogle	Trust Services.	CN=Google	e Internet A	uthority G3
	336350306	2018-02-20	2018-02-20	C=US, O=Go	ogle	Trust Services.	CN=Google	e Internet A	uthority G3
	336346392	2018-02-20	2018-02-20	C=US, O=Go	ogle	Inc, CN=Goog	le Internet A	uthority G2	
	336346028	2018-02-20	2018-02-20	C=US, O=Go	ogle	Inc, CN=Goog	le Internet A	uthority G2	
	336345700	2018-02-20	2018-02-20	C=US, O=Go	ogle	Inc, CN=Goog	le Internet A	uthority G2	
	329172204	2018-02-13	2018-02-13	C=US, O=Go	ogle	Trust Services	CN=Google	e Internet A	uthority G3
	329172151	2018-02-13	2018-02-13	C=US, O=Go	ogle	Trust Services,	CN=Google	e Internet A	uthority G3
	329171802	2018-02-13	2018-02-13	C=US, O=Go	ogle	Trust Services	CN=Google	e Internet A	uthority G3
	<u>329166969</u>	2018-02-13	2018-02-13	C=US, O=Go	ogle	Inc, CN=Goog	le Internet A	uthority G2	

We Can find pre-existing certificates

- Note the purchase date of said domain
- Search CT logs for certs pre-dating that date and valid after
- Monitor
 - Old certs may not show up in logs for years, *if ever*

← → C <mark>🔒 c</mark>	→ C C CMODO CA Limited [GB] https://crt.sh/?q=insecure.design							
					crt.s	h Id	entity S	earch
					Criteria	a Id	lentity = 'insecu	ire.design'
Certificates	crt.sh ID	Logged At 1	Not Before	Not After				
	601131287	2018-07-13	2018-07-13	2018-10-11	C=US, O=Let	s Encrypt	CN=Let's Enc	rypt Authority X3
	466890465	2018-05-17			0 00 0T 0			ford, O=COMOD



A significant example

stripe.com


Stripe 2010

http://www.stripe.com.80/

Loading...

Redirecting to...

Stripe 2011



Certificate spanning both owners

	Timestamp		ntry # Log		tor		Lo	og URL	
	2016-09-22 15:40:05 UTC	283	54177 God	ogle	h	ttps://ct.	googl	eapis.com/rocketee	er
	Mechanism Provi	er	Status	rcev	cati	on Date	Last	Observed in CRL	Last Checked (Error)
	OCSP The C	A	Check	?			n/a		?
	CRL The C	A	Not Revoke	d n/a			n/a		2018-02-22 01:38:01 UTC
	CRLSet/Blacklist Goog		Not Revoke	d n/a			n/a		n/a
	disallowedcert.stl Micro		Not Revoke	d n/a			n/a		n/a
	OneCRL Mozill		Not Revoke				n/a		n/a
	E3DF3CEB9CD87AB70	DFD	68EEBFBE	904179	F3A	070	F4152	2B396539B43A6FA	νB
	DD6281788A5C34D1C2	31A	0470AF6C2	246E41	2F54				
	Certificate:								
	Data:								
	Version: 3	(0:	x2)						
	Serial Num	ber	:						
	2d:8e:	86:	34:3c:3f:	a7:0e	:94:	87:54:	17:8	4:70:b1:a8	
	Signature Algo	rit	hm: shalW	lithRS	AEnc	ryptio	n		
	Issuer: (CA	ID: 2	20)						
	common	Name	е		=	UTN-U	SERF	irst-Hardware	
	organi	zat	ionalUnit	Name	=	http:	//ww	w.usertrust.co	m
	organi	zat:	ionName		-	The U	SERT	RUST Network	
	locali	tyNa	ame		=	Salt	Lake	City	
	state0	rPro	ovinceNam	le	=	UT			
	countr	yNar	me		=	US			
	Validate	_					_		
	Not Be	fore	e: Feb 5	00:0	0:00	2009	GMT		
	Not Af	ter	: Feb 5	23:5	9:59	2011	GMT		
	Subject.								
	common					WWW.S			
			ionalUnit					stantSSL	
			ionalUnit					WebCentral Pt	y Ltd
			ionalUnit	Name		Busin			
			ionName					y. Ltd.	
	street							untain Street	
localityName					Ultim	0			
			ovinceNam	le		NSW			
	postal					2154			
	countr				=	AU			
	Subject Pu								
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How big is this issue?

Searched Certificate Transparency (CT) for certificates that overlap multiple domain registrations

Data

- 3 million domains, 7.7 million certs
 - 1% of internet
- Looked for changes...
 - Expiration date
 - Email contacts
 - Registrar
 - Etc...

Sources

- CT logs
- Historical WHOIS
- Historical nameservers <u>https://dns.coffee</u>
- WayBack Machine <u>https://archive.org</u>

Not perfect: false positives/negatives

1.5M (0.45%)

Of domains tested have pre-existing certificates

25% haven't expired yet

BygoneSSL

noun

A SSL certificate created <u>before</u> and <u>supersedes</u> its domains' current registration date

Could it be worse?

- Certificates can have many domains (alt-names)
- Certificates can contain some bygone domains and some not





CDN with 700 domains on one certificate

$\leftrightarrow \rightarrow G$	COMODO [GB]	https://crt.sh/?id=21 🏠
	DNS	Contraction contraction
	DNS	the second se
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	DNS :	
	DNS	the second second
	DNS:	The Party of the P
	DNS	feedbackgroop.com
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	DNS	
	DNS	
	DMC	21



Can we revoke these certs?

If no....

- Spend 10k on a domain, you're screwed for years
- Bad guys could squat on desirable domains
- Cry

If yes...

- You can take down production certs you don't own
- You can DoS companies



Digging deeper....



- Rules that dictate how CA's and browsers operate
- If broken browsers distrust the CA

Baseline Requirements for the Issuance and Management of Publicly-Trusted Certificates

Section 9.6.3

5. **Reporting and Revocation:** An obligation and warranty to: (a) promptly request revocation of the Certificate, and cease using it and its associated Private Key, if there is any actual or suspected misuse or compromise of the Subscriber's Private Key associated with the Public Key included in the Certificate, and (b) promptly request revocation of the Certificate, and cease using it, if any information in the Certificate is or becomes incorrect or inaccurate.

https://cabforum.org/wp-content/uploads/CA-Browser-Forum-BR-1.5.7-29-Apr-2018.pdf



Within 24 hours

4.9.1.1. Reasons for Revoking a Subscriber Certificate

The CA SHALL revoke a Certificate within 24 hours if one or more of the following occurs:

1. The Subscriber requests in writing that the CA invoke the Certificate;

2. The Subscriber notifies the CA that the original ce. ificate request was not authorized and does not retroactively grant authorization;

3. The CA obtains evidence that the Subscriber's Private Key corresponding to the Public Key in the Certificate suffered a Key Compromise or no longer complies with the requirements of Sections 6.1.5 and 6.1.6;

4. The CA obtains evidence that the Certificate was misused;

5. The CA is made aware that a Subscriber has violated one or more of its material obligations under the Subscriber Agreement or Terms of Use;

6. The CA is made aware of any circumstance indicating that use of Fully-Qualified Domain Name or IP address in the Certificate is no longer legally permitted (e.g. a court parbitrator has revoked a Domain Name Registrant's right to use the Domain Name, a relevant licensing or services agreement between the Domain Name Registrant and the Applicant has terminated, or the Domain Name Registrant has failed to renew the Domain Name);

7. The CA is made aware that a Wildcard Certificate has been used to authenticate a fraudulently misleading subordinate Fully-Qualified Domain Name;

We can DoS production sites



Certificate for bar.com can be revoked because it is shared with foo.com which has changed ownership during the certificates lifetime

7M (2.05%)

Of domains share a certificate with bygone domains

~4x increase!

41% haven't expired yet



Sounds like we can break stuff....





BygoneSSL

BygoneSSL Man in the Middle

If a company acquires a previously owned domain...

Previous owners could still have valid certificates

MitM the SSL connection with a certificate generated by the previous owner

BygoneSSL Denial of Service

If a certificate has a subject alt-name for a domain no longer owned...

Revoke the certificate with a vulnerable domain and non-vulnerable domain listed in the alternative names

You can DoS the service if the shared certificate is still in use!

Revisiting the CDN... we bought the bygone domain

Namecheap Order Summary

Date: Jul 30, 2018 02:58:28 AM

Dear Dylan,

Thank you for choosing Namecheap. Here's a summary of your order.

Order Details

Order Date:	Jul 30, 2018 02:58:23 AM	Payment Source:	PAYPAL
Order Number:	36904491	Initial Charge:	\$11.16
Transaction ID:	42847337	Final Cost:	\$11.16
User Name:	dayrey		
Address:		Total Refund:	N/A
		Refund Transaction ID:	N/A
		Refunded To:	N/A

TITLE Domain Registratien <u>feedbackgroop.com</u>

Q	TY DURATION	N PRICE	SUB TOTAL
			\$10.98
1	1 year	\$10.98	ICANN Fee \$0.18
		Sub Total	\$0.00
		TOTAL	\$11.16



Digicert Inc.

Trying to revoke test cert

- 1 day turn around
- We emailed support@digicert.com

- Few weeks turn around
- We emailed ec2-abuse@amazon.com

$\pi\pi$ here above this list to add a note to this request $\pi\pi$
Thank you,
I just sent an email to the domain owner as listed here https://whois.icann.org/en/lookup?name=a
When you receive the email, please reply and we will be happy to revoke the certificate.
Sorry for any confusion.
Thank you for contacting Digicert support and if there is anything else we can help you with, please let us know.
Technical Support Manager



Hello,

Thank you for following up.Below is the most recent update from our specialist team that handles certificates.

Guidance is as follows:

1. The customer will need to setup the 5 common email addresses.

- 2. We will re-send the confirmation email.
- 3. Upon confirmation from the domain owner, we can revoke the certificate.

Regards, AWS Abuse Team



Trying to revoke with Comodo....

- Still waiting....
- We opened many support chats and emailed security@comodo.com

20:10Edw :Unfortunately, without account ownership verification, it is impossible to perform such actions with the certificate.

20:25Mar and Control Unfortunately, I cannot revoke the certificate without verifying the account ownership.

Roger9:33 AM

You can forget about this SSL and order a new SSL for : insecure.design




Trying to revoke with Let's Encrypt

- Current Policy
 - require proving ownership of all domains
- Reached out to CPS Contact
 - Recognized the conflict with CA/B Forum
 - Considering changing the policy



CertGraph

An open source intelligence tool to crawl the graph of certificate alternate names




https://github.com/lanrat/certgraph

BygoneSSL DoS Detection

certgraph -depth 1 -driver google -ct-subdomains -cdn [DOMAIN]...



CertGraph do.com



https://github.com/lanrat/certgraph



Example: do.com

Current Nameservers				
Name	First Seen			
NS2.UNIREGISTRY-DNS.NET	Dec 02, 2017			
NS1.UNIREGISTRY-DNS.COM	Dec 02, 2017			
NS2.UNIREGISTRY-DNS.COM	Dec 02, 2017			
NS1.UNIREGISTRY-DNS.NET	Dec 02, 2017			

Name	First Seen	Last Seen
	D. 01,0017	D01,0017
BUY.INTERNETTRAFFIC.COM	Dec 01, 2017	Dec 01, 2017
NS-774.AWSDNS-32.NET	Jul 05, 2014	Nov 30, 2017
NS-1654.AWSDNS-14.CO.UK	Jul 05, 2014	Nov 30, 2017
	1-105,0014	New 20, 2017
NS-469.AWSDNS-58.COM	Jul 05, 2014	Nov 30, 2017
NS-1617.AWSDNS-10.CO.UK	Aug 24, 2011	Jul 04, 2014
NS-416.AWSDNS-52.COM	Aug 24, 2011	Jul 04, 2014
NS-881.AWSDNS-46.NET	Aug 24, 2011	Jul 04, 2014
NS-1224.AWSDNS-25.ORG	Aug 24, 2011	Jul 04, 2014
NS1.MARKSMEN.COM	Jun 25, 2011	Aug 23, 2011
NS2.MARKSMEN.COM	Jun 25, 2011	Aug 23, 2011
NS4.MSFT.NET		Jun 23, 2011
NS5.MSFT.NET		Jun 23, 2011
NS1.MSFT.NET		Jun 23, 2011
NS2.MSFT.NET		Jun 23, 2011
NS3.MSFT.NET		Jun 23, 2011

counce prano	
Validity	and the second se
Not Before: Aug 24 00:00	
Not After : Aug 23 23:59	9:59 2018 GMT
Subject:	
commonName	= www.salesforce.com
organizationalUnitName	= Applications
organizationName	= Salesforce.com, Inc
localityName	= San Francisco
stateOrProvinceName	= California
countryName	= US
Subject Public Key Info:	-
Public Key Algorithm: rs	
Public-Key: (2048 bi	it)
Modulus:	
	lc:39:91:55:ae:9a:53:71:53:f7: p9:bb:26:d4:83:71:d4:c2:74:e6:
	la:6f:d6:f1:30:6d:29:6c:61:0a:
	69:40:3f:da:91:8d:88:30:aa:93:
	85:b0:a5:9d:b7:ab:d8:34:80:e5:
	51:17:ba:ed:c4:bc:27:b8:ca:f6:
	lf:63:44:b0:f6:df:31:d3:e1:3c:
	3d:68:38:eb:de:f1:08:db:cf:6f:
	67:60:89:08:64:c9:15:f8:88:50:
	58:e5:03:61:9d:49:89:d8:f8:6d:
	lf:d7:e3:83:74:6f:27:ba:40:f1:
	c3:2a:c9:cb:71:c7:68:54:dc:d2:
	e5:a2:19:3c:c3:9c:4a:68:84:b8:
6f:81:74:c6:98:2	2c:99:3a:43:dc:27:9a:78:92:ed:
	df:d6:d3:ba:8b:a2:87:4e:25:60:
bd:30:b5:c7:95:a	a0:58:96:06:94:40:f0:a2:b2:7c:
ff:58:f0:78:b0:c	c4:6f:8a:cb:4e:c1:69:11:d9:33:
9f:cl	
Exponent: 65537 (0x1	10001)
X509v3 extensions:	
X509v3 Subject Alternati	
DNS:www.salesforce.c	com
DNS:salesforce.com	
DNS:sfdcstatic.com	
DNS:chatter.com	
DNS:force.com	
DNS:data.com	
DNS:*.sfdcstatic.com	n
DNS:*.chatter.com	
DNS:*.force.com	
DNS:	
DNS:*.do.com	
DNS:do.com	

E

BygoneSSL Facebook Search Tool

- Requires Facebook developer account
- Detects BygoneSSL DoS
- Detect BygoneSSL MitM certificates instantly
- Rate limited

BygoneSSL Search https://github.com/dxa4481/bygonessl

facebook for developers

(venv) → tool git:(master) X python bygonessl.py --config exampleConfig.json

BygoneSSL DoS detected on a cert with 81 domains. Cert sha256: cf618fdf457693711e3deeaaca41d52b7056c4f6bc4345efe76fd3356b6b7a01 BygoneSSL DoS detected on a cert with 83 domains. Cert sha256: 0f14d6215e61bd356f4eaed2f94375f3fff7c2c211189ef93f9b73235b2b66a6 BygoneSSL MITM with insecure.design for cert 4cf5e402bcb5429fe3a83855592cae904c7e91b1f3c6d908e8f7e4d568496acb good until 2021-02-16T23:59:59+0000 (venv) → tool git:(master) x

BygoneSSL Certificate Transparency Log Monitor

Detect BygoneSSL MitM certificates Updated SSLMate's CertSpotter Log Monitor Tool <u>https://github.com/SSLMate/certspotter</u>

Watchlist file example:

```
insecure.design valid_at:2018-04-18
defcon.org valid_at:1993-06-21
wikipedia.org valid_at:2001-01-13
toorcon.net valid at:2012-03-13
```

4cf5e402bcb5429fe3a83855592cae904c7e91b1f3c6d908e8f7e4d568496acb:

DNS Name = insecure.design DNS Name = www.insecure.design Pubkey = ebcla7c807a20e360aa083cf2bfafcc0468af1de8404a61a2004699cbdc394e6 Issuer = C=GB, ST=Greater Manchester, L=Salford, 0=COMODO CA Limited, CN=COMODO RSA Domain Validation Secure Server CA Not Before = 2018-02-17 00:00:00 +0000 UTC Not After = 2021-02-16 23:59:59 +0000 UTC BygoneSSL = True Log Entry = 3 @ http://ct.example.com:6962 (Certificate) crt.sh = https://crt.sh/?sha256=4cf5e402bcb5429fe3a83855592cae904c7e91b1f3c6d908e8f7e4d568496acb

Things you can do to protect your domain

- Use the Expect-CT HTTP header with enforce to ensure that only CT logged certs will be trusted for your domain
 - If a previous owners certificate is in CT logs, request the CA revoke it
 - Hope user checks CRL lists or OCSP
- We should continuously monitor CT logs for old certs
 - CT has only been required for non-EV since April 2018
 - Only required for certificates issued after April
 - Check currently owned domains as well for older certificates
 - Use CertSpotter or BygoneSSL to monitor logs for MitM
 - Use CertGraph with bygonessl to monitor for DoS

Things the internet can do

- Registrars could show pre-existing certificates for domain registrations
 - Include related alt-names
- CAs could only issue short lived (90 day) certificates
 - Let's Encrypt!
- Notify all alt-name owners of revocation
- CAs should not issue certificates valid for longer than domain registration
- Be careful with subject alt-names
 - \circ ~ If you're a hosting client domains, check CRL's and replace certs as needed
 - Best to use single certificate for each customer

Thank You

More information https://insecure.design

CertGraph https://github.com/lanrat/certgraph

BygoneSSL Search https://github.com/dxa4481/bygonessl

CertSpotter https://github.com/SSLMate/certspotter